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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLYDE J. KNAPP, OLIVES. KNAPP, 1 
JEFF KNAPP, an infant, by Clyde 
J. Knapp, his Guardian ad Litem, 
VICKIE KNAPP, an infant, by Clyde 
J. Knapp, her Guardian ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ~ 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION 
OF AMERICA, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 1 
Case No. 
8875 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for rescission of an exchange by 
plaintiff and respondent, Clyde J. Knapp, of certain real 
and personal property subject to contracts of sale for a 
total of 1500 shares of the capital stock of defendant and 
cash in the amount of $4,383.03. (For convenience, defen-
dant and appellant will be referred to as defendant, plain-
tiffs and respondents will be referred to collectively as 
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2 
plaintiffs and plaintiff and respondent, Clyde J. Knapp 
will be referred to as Knapp.) 
Defendant is a small Utah life insurance corporation 
incorporated as a stock company in 1953. Following a per-
iod of growing pains and severe financial distress (of which 
more will be said later) during which period the transac-
tion complained of took place, the defendant company was 
reorganized in the fall of 1955, some $200,000.00 was in-
vested therein by the present management and the present 
management completely replaced all former officers and 
all but one of the former directors. None of the present 
principal stockholders nor any of the present officers or 
directors had any part in the transaction complained of in 
this case. 
Knapp is a local businessman and has dealt in invest-
ments and real estate (Tr. 76). He has made loans in sub-
stantial amounts over the years (Tr. 100-102). He was at 
the time of transaction complained of the president, a di-
rector and a stockholder in Knapp Uranium Company. The 
other plaintiffs are Knapp's wife and children, respectively, 
who received certain shares of defendant's stock as a part 
of the transaction complained of. 
Negotiations for the exchange transaction began in 
early November of 1955 (Tr. 4, 177) when Daniel H. 
Heaton, an old friend and business acquaintance of Knapp 
(Tr. ~9-102, 174), (who was also a stock salesman for the 
defendant), approached Knapp concerning an investment 
in the company. He emphasized the fact that it was not 
necessary to invest cash and that the company would ac-
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cept real estate (Tr. 4). Knapp and Heaton testified (Tr. 
4-6, 178) that Heaton showed Knapp letters concerning the 
company and its prospects written by Dr. Wesley L. Bayles 
(Ex. P-1) and John H. Coles (Ex. P-3), who were both 
directors of the company at the time and by Cleo H. Bullard 
(Ex. P-2), who was the president and a director of the 
company at the time. Later in November, Heaton took 
Knapp to talk to Mr. Coles, Mr. Peter M. Lowe (who was 
then vice-president and a director of the company) and Mr. 
Bullard. These men discussed with Knapp the prospects 
of the company, their opinion of its investment potential 
and the financial situation of the company. With respect 
to the latter, Knapp and Heaton stated that Mr. Coles and 
Mr. Bullard discussed in some detail the company's Sep-
tember 30, 1954 financial statement (Ex. P-4). A sort of 
prospectus was also furnished Knapp (Ex. P-28). 
It would unnecessarily burden this brief to set out in 
detail the discussions had during this negotiation period. 
(For further detail see Tr. 9-20, 180-192.) It is sufficient to 
say that plaintiffs alleged that some sixteen statements 
made during these discussions or in the letters from the 
directors or in the September 30, 1954 financial statement 
were false. Generally, these statements related to the 
financial condition of the company and its prospects for the 
future and included such statements as-the company was 
in "good standing" with the State Insurance Department, 
the company was going to pay a dividend of ten per cent on 
its outstanding stock in 1954, the September 30, 1954 finan-
cial statement set forth the true financial condition of the 
company at that time, that the company had passed its 
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4 
period of growing pains. (See Findings of Fact, R. 17 for 
a list of the alleged statements.) 
The actual exchange transaction took place at the end 
of the year 1954. The exchange contract (Ex. P-9) was 
dated December 30, 1954. By the terms of the contract, 
plaintiffs received a total of 1500 shares of defendant's 
capital stock (Ex. P-10, Tr. 38) and cash of $4,383.03. (The 
contract erroneously states this figure as $4,385.03. The 
smaller amount was actually paid and accepted.) Defen-
dant received a deed to certain farm property in Salt Lake 
County (Ex. P-8) and a bill of sale to certain livestock and 
equipment used on the farm. Both the farm and part of the 
livestock and equipment were transferred subject to con-
tracts of sale to Daniel H. Heaton (the same Heaton who 
first approached Knapp concerning the transaction) and 
Volma W. Heaton, Daniel H. Heaton's son. The balance of 
the livestock and equipment was sold subject to a contract 
of sale between Knapp and his wife as Sellers and Volma 
W. Heaton and his wife as Buyers (see Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7 
and P-8). The instruments of transfer all were dated Jan-
uary 5, 1955. 
The exchange contract recites that the value of the 
1500 shares of stock is $20.00 per share and that the total 
value of the contracts covering the land, livestock and 
equipment was $34,385.03 (this figure should be $34,383.-
03) . $34,383.03 equalled the total unpaid balance then due 
on all of the contracts of sale made up of $27,875.00 then 
due on the farm property and certain of the livestock and 
equipment therein described (Ex. P-5) and $6,508.03 then 
due on the balance of the livestock and equipment (Ex. P-6 
and P-7). 
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5 
At about the same time as the transaction between 
plaintiffs and defendant, new contracts of sale between 
defendant and the Heatons were substituted for the old 
contracts between Knapp and the Heatons which had been 
assigned to defendant (Exs. P-33 and P-34). The same 
property was covered but the amount of the monthly pay-
ments was reduced. These substituted contracts were both 
dated December 30, 1954. 
From time to time during the year 1954, the Insurance 
Commisioner had questioned the financial condition of 
defendant (see Exs. P-45 and P-48, Tr. 676-681) but a regu-
lar license was issued for the year 1954 (Tr. 391). On 
April 8, 1954, the Insurance Commissioner notified defen-
dant of an impairment in its capital stock (Ex. P-45). 
Correspondence ensued between the Insurance Commis-
sioner and the defendant (Exs. P-46 and P-49) and the 
September 30, 1954 financial statement was prepared at 
the request of the Commissioner and submitted to him in 
October of that year (Tr. 682-683). The Insurance Com-
missioner met with officers of the defendant but no action 
was taken to implement the impairment notice. 
However, when the 1954 license expired on February 
28, 1955, only a conditional license was issued to defendant 
(Ex. D-58, Tr. 392). The Commissioner by letter of March 
25, 1955 (Ex. P-52) notified defendant of certain deficien-
cies in its financial condition. In particular, the Commis-
sioner noted that the defendant's holding of two parcels 
of real property was illegal. One of these parcels was the 
property Knapp had traded and the other was some prop-
erty Heaton had transferred in exchange for stock. 
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On April 6, 1955, the Commissioner formally notified 
defendant of his intention to revoke defendant's certificate 
of authority to do business (Ex. P-53). The time when 
the revocation would take effect was extended each month 
for thirty days each time until about September 1, 1955 
(Tr. 357). 
Shortly after the April 6, 1955 order was given, the 
Insurance Commissioner appointed Herman L. Wood and 
Richard K. Nelson of the accounting firm of Wood, Child, 
Mann & Smith to conduct an audit of the company. Be-
cause the books of the company were not made immediately 
available to these auditors the Commissioner issued his 
order of April 20, 1955 (Ex. P-54) threatening immediate 
revocation of the company's license because the books were 
not supplied. The auditors were given access to the books 
and no action was taken to implement the order of April 
20th, but the company continued under the threatened re-
vocation order of April 6th as extended from month to 
month. The audit continued through the summer of 1955 
and was completed in September. The audit report (Ex. 
P-55) was given to the Insurance Commissioner and based 
on this report demand was made on the company for a 
prompt reorganization to cure its impaired financial con-
dition (Ex. P-56). The reorganization of the company then 
took place and was completed early in November of 1955. 
During this period, the company continued operating 
and efforts were made to satisfy the demands of the In-
surance Commissioner. There was unrest among some of 
the stockholders and a proxy fight was threatened to unseat 
1\llr. Bullard and other directors up for re-election at the 
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May, 1955 annual meeting. There is evidence (Tr. 6~1) 
that prior to the annual meeting Bullard had approached 
Knapp with an offer to return the property Knapp had 
traded if Knapp would return his stock. Knapp denies such 
an offer was made (Tr. 156-157). 
The stockholders' meeting in May of 1955 came at a 
period of crisis for the company. The Insurance Commis-
sioner's demands on the company were pressing and the 
proxy fight did develop. It is noteworthy that Knapp was 
on the opposition slate of directors (Tr. 129-130, 736). 
Knapp attended the meeting with his friend, Heaton (Tr. 
130, 688). 
At the meeting there was considerable and heated dis-
cussion of the actions taken and the attitude of the Insur-
ance Commissioner. The Insurance Commissioner's orders 
of April 6, 1955 and April 20, 1955, (Exhibits P-53 and 
P-54) were discussed (Tr. 698-699, 730-732) and the Com-
missioner's letter (Ex. P-52) referring to certain deficien-
cies, including the illegal investment in the property traded 
by Knapp, was read (Tr. 894, 695-696). Bullard told the 
stockholders that the company had been impaired ( Tr. 
730), but that steps were being taken to correct the situa-
tion. When Bullard was questioned further as to what 
impaired meant, Vernal Bergeson, a stockholder in atten-
dance at the meeting, said it meant the company was broke 
and that "Mr. Bullard has thrown our money away" (Tr. 
731). 
A financial statement of the company (Ex. D-68) was 
distributed to the stockholders at the meeting (Tr. 696, 
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824) and was discussed ( Tr. 824) . Knapp testified that 
he did not recall receiving this statement but he did receive 
another financial statement (Ex. P-69) through the mail 
(Tr. 137). Knapp testified that he was unconcerned about 
what went on at the meeting (Tr. 136) and was willing to 
rely on Mr. Bullard to correct the situation (Tr. 135). He 
stated "the only things * * * of any importance" 
which needed correcting was to change into an acceptable 
form the real estate holdings of the company, including the 
real estate he had traded to the company for his stock (Tr. 
134-135). 
Going back to the property Knapp traded, the Heatons 
were in possession of the property at the time of the trade 
and continued in possession until the summer of 1955. How-
ever, the payments on the contract fell in arrears (Tr. 231, 
285-286) . Defendant took no action at that time to collect 
the delinquencies. Heaton testified that in the spring of 
1955, Bullard authorized Heaton to try to sell the property. 
Heaton arranged a trade of the property for other property 
but the deal fell through ( Tr. 226-230) . About this same 
time Volma Heaton, with the consent of the defendant, sold 
the livestock and equipment to a third party (Tr. 244). 
Because of the delinquent payments on the contract, 
a notice to quit was served on the Heatons (Ex. P-36). No 
court action was taken because early in August of 1955, 
the company began negotiations with Daniel H. Heaton to 
rescind a transaction between the defendant and Heaton 
involving a trade of stock for real property (Tr. 237, Ex-
hibit P-31). It was suggested that a similar trade-back be 
a1·ranged between Knapp and the company, and Heaton was 
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authorized to approach Knapp on the subject. There is a 
dispute in the testimony as to whether the offer was to 
trade-back the real property for an equivalent amount of 
stock with no cash being involved or whether the offer was 
to return the real property in exchange for plaintiff's stock 
and $2,000.00 (Tr. 157-159, 166-170, 256, 261, 263-267, 
268-278,303-305, 309-312, 744-795). Knapp was approached 
at least twice on this subject and turned the proposition 
down saying "when you make an investment you don't want 
to take it back, you want to make some money" (Tr. middle 
page 158). 
After Knapp refused to trade-back, the real property 
Knapp had turned in was sold to Heaton and the company 
took back a mortgage on the property which it now holds. 
At about the same time, Heaton resold the property to J. E. 
Morrison, on a real estate contract (Ex. P-39). 
According to Knapp, the first idea he had that he had 
been defrauded was early in September of 1955 when he 
received the letter dated August 30, 1955 (Ex. P-11) from 
Reese Anderson concerning the necessity for reorganization 
of the company. Knapp went to his attorney, Vernon Rom-
ney, to discuss the matter. Romney went to the Insurance 
Department and was told that an audit of the defendant 
had been ordered which would ultimately be available for 
public inspection. Knapp testified that during September 
he contacted his attorney to ask about the matter and was 
told that the audit was not yet available. In October, Mr. 
Romney was able to inspect the audit report. A notice of 
rescission (Ex. P-15) was served on the company and its 
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directors on October 25, 1955 and the company refused to 
rescind by letter dated November 3, 1955 (Ex. P-16). 
The trial court found that of the sixteen allegedly false 
statements one had not been made and another was not 
entirely false. Of the remaining fourteen the trial court 
found that Knapp did not reply or had no right to rely on 
three of the statements. Of the remaining eleven state-
ments the court found that the statements were false, were 
made for the purpose of inducing Knapp to consummate the 
exchange, were material, were relied on and believed by 
Knapp, and that he had the right to rely on such statements. 
The trial court further found and concluded that plaintiffs 
are entitled to rescind the transaction, did not waive their 
right to rescind, were not guilty of such delay or laches as 
to justify denying their right to rescind, and are not es-
topped by their conduct or by any delay to demand rescis-
sion. 
The plaintiffs prayed in the alternative for rescission 
and return of all the property Knapp had traded to the 
company or "in case defendant is unable to or fails to re-
convey" said property, for a money judgment "for the value 
of any such property which cannot be or is not so recon-
veyed and returned". It is self evident and conceded by 
plaintiffs below that the latter alternative must apply for, 
as previously stated, the livestock and equipment were sold 
by Volma Heaton and are now beyond defendant's control 
and the real property is now vested in D. H. Heaton subject 
to a contract of sale to J. E. Morrison with defendant hold-
ing only a mortgage. 
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The defendant being unable to rescind in kind, the 
court awarded plaintiffs a money judgment for $34,383.03, 
less the cash plaintiffs had received in the trade, plus in-
terest. The amount of the judgment was based on a find-
ing that the reasonable and "agreed" value of the property 
traded by Knapp was $34,383.03. The court made no find-
ing as to what the fair market value of the traded property 
was at the time of the trade or at the time the notice of 
rescission was given or at the time of the trial. Defendant's 
attempts to prove by appraisals the fair market value of 
the traded property were rejected (Tr. 795-809, Ex. 71; 
Tr. 88-91, Exs. D-18 and D-19) and defendant's attempt 
to inquire whether all of the property referred to in the 
instruments transferred was actually transferred was re-
jected (Tr. 123-124). 
At the trial, plaintiffs offered to accept the return of 
the real property subject to the Morrison contract if de-
fendant could negotiate successfully with Heaton to get a 
reconveyance of the property (Tr. 68-72, 252-256, 803-804, 
860-861). The unpaid balance due on the Morrison contract 
at the time of reconveyance to plaintiffs would be credited 
on the money judgment awarded and said judgment would 
be partially satisfied accordingly. A money judgment was 
rendered and said method of partial payment thereof was 
authorized. 
We have not referred in this Statement of Facts to the 
testimony of Victor K. Cummings (Tr. 435-590) and Her-
man L. Wood (Tr. 590-625) as we believe their testimony 
is not directly involved on this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IF THERE WAS FRAUD, PLAINTIFFS ARE 
NOW BARRED FROM ASSERTING IT BY 
THEIR LACK OF DILIGENCE IN RESCIND-
ING AND BY LACHES. 
(a) A Party seeking rescission must give notice 
of his intention to rescind promptly after discovery 
of the fraud or of facts putting him on notice of 
the fraud. 
(b) Plaintiffs' action should be barred by laches. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
MONEY JUDGMENT AWARDED PLAINTIFFS 
IN THIS ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IF THERE WAS FRAUD, PLAINTIFFS ARE 
NOW BARRED FROM ASSERTING IT BY 
THEIR LACK OF DILIGENCE IN RESCIND-
ING AND BY LACHES. 
(a) A Party seeking resdssion must give notice 
of his intention to rescind promptly after discovery 
of the fraud or of facts putting him on notice of 
the fraud. 
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It is well settled in Utah and the great majority of 
other jurisdictions that a defrauded party must act 
promptly to rescind a transaction after acquiring knowl-
edge of fraud or, its equivalent, knowledge of facts putting 
him on notice of fraud. Rescission, being an equitable rem-
edy, will be denied where the defrauded party has not 
exercised the diligence equity requires. This court in Taylor 
v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. 2d 222, stated that: 
"The party who has been misled is required, 
as soon as he learns the truth, and discovers the 
falsity of the statements on which he relied, with 
all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the contract and 
give the other party an opportunity of rescinding 
it, and of restoring both of them to their original 
position. The party deceived is not allowed to go 
on deriving all possible benefit from the transaction 
and then claim to be relieved of his own obligation 
by seeking its rescission." 
The court relied on the statement in 5 Ruling Case Law, 
514 as follows : 
"The great weight of authority holds that if 
the party defrauded continues to receive benefits 
under the contract after he has become aware of the 
fraud, or if he otherwise conducts himself with 
respect to it as if it were a subsisting and binding 
engagement he will be deemed to have affirmed the 
contract and waived his right to rescind." 
Again, in McKeller Real Estate and Investment Com-
pany v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128, this court stated: 
"Any action on the part of the purchaser treat-
ing the contract as in force, when done with a knowl-
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edge of the facts creating a right of rescission, 
amounts to a waiver of the right to rescind because 
of the existence of such facts." 
See also Skala v. Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185 and 
Levine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2. 
Delay alone is enough to preclude an action for rescis-
sion. 
In the recent case of Gedstad v. Ellichman, 124 C. A. 
2d 831, 269 P. 2d 661, the court denied rescission of a con-
tract holding: 
"In such a suit acting promptly is a condition 
of his right to rescind, Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 
Cal. 226, 243, 193 Pac. 243; Neff v. Engler, 205 Cal. 
484, 488, 271 P. 744, and therefore diligence must 
be shown by the actor whereas in other actions 
laches is an affirmative defense to be alleged by the 
defending party. Absence of explanation of delay 
may even cause a complaint for rescission to be de-
murrable. Bancroft v. Woodward, 183 Cal. 99, 109, 
190 P. 445. A delay of more than one month in serv-
ing notice of rescission requires explanation. Camp-
bell v. Title Guarantee Etc. Co., 121 Cal. App. 374, 
377, 9 P. 2d 264. The diligence is required through-
out and it applies as well to the time a person will 
be held aware of his right to rescind as to the time 
he will be held to have discovered the facts on which 
that right is based. Bancroft v. Woodward, supra, 
183 Cal. 99, 108, 190 P. 445; First Nat. Bk. v. 
Thompson, 212 Cal. 388, 401, 298 P. 808." 
It has been held that unless a plaintiff gives notice of re-
.. scission within 30 days after receiving knowledge of the 
fraud or after obtaining facts which would put one on notice 
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of the fraud, he is completely barred from an action of 
rescission. See Campbell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 
121 C. A. 37 4, 9 P. 2d 264, where the court stated: "From 
an examination of authorities, it would appear that 30 days 
is about the utmost limit of time which the courts are dis-
posed to allow to the purchaser for rescission, unless there 
are unusual circumstances in the case excusing longer 
delay." In King v. Los Angeles County Fair Association, 161 
P. 2d 468, there are numerous cases cited where a delay in 
taking action for less than a year was held to bar relief. 
See also the cases cited in Campbell v. Title Guarantee & 
Trust Co., supra, and in Estrada v. Alvarez, 38 Cal. 2d 386, 
240 P. 2d 278. 
The above rulings apply not only when the plaintiff 
fails to act diligently after knowledge of the fraud itself, 
but also when the plaintiff fails to act diligently after re-
ceiving knowledge of facts putting him on notice of the 
fraud. Thus, the Utah court in barring an action for re-
scission of the sale of stock stated "all of the facts concern-
ing which he alleges misrepresentations could have been 
learned by him, if indeed he did not already know the truth 
about them, very shortly after the transaction". Skola v. 
Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185. The California court 
in Bancroft v. Woodward, 183 Cal. 99, 190 Pac. 445 stated 
the rule very clearly: 
"It is well settled that where a party has knowl-
edge of facts of a character which would reasonably 
put him upon inquiry, and such inquiry, if pursued, 
would have led to a discovery of the fraud or other 
ground for rescission, he will be charged with hav-
ing discovered the fraud or other ground as of the 
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time he should have discovered it, that is, as of the 
time when he would have discovered it if he had 
with reasonable diligence, pursued the inquiry when 
he should have done so. Lady Washington, etc., Co. 
v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45 P. 809; Harrington v. 
Patterson, 124 Cal. 542, 57 P. 476. 
"The reason for this rule is that diligence 
throughout is required of one who would rescind. 
It is a reason which applies with equal if not greater 
force to the time at which such a person, after learn-
ing of the facts upon which his right is based, will 
be held to be aware of their legal consequence, his 
right to rescind. It is at least intimated in Ruhl v. 
M ott, 120 Cal. 668, 679, 53 P. 304, and Hannah v. 
Steinman, 159 Cal. 142, 153, 112 P. 1094, that the 
rule is the same in regard to the time as of which 
a person seeking rescission will be charged with 
knowledge of his right, as it is in regard to the time 
as of which he will be charged with a discovery of 
the facts which give him the right, and the reason for 
this is so plain that we have no hesitation in declar-
ing it to be the case." 
See also, Lady Washington Etc. Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 
482, 45 Pac. 809; Gedstad v. Ellichman, supra; Garstang v. 
Skinner, 165 Cal. 721, 134 Pac. 329. 
Considering now the facts in this case, it is apparent 
that Knapp knew of the fraud or of extremely suspicious 
circumstances in connection with the company long prior to 
October 25, 1955, when he finally gave defendant notice of 
rescission. The court will note that virtually all of the 
alleged misrepresentations relate to the financial condition 
of the defendant. It was, of course, primarily financial 
difficulties that caused the concern of the Insurance Com-
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missioner and led to his actions as outlined in the State-
ment of Facts and eventually to the financial and mana-
gerial reorganization of the company in the fall of 1955. 
Finding of Fact No.6 of the court (R. 19) we consider 
very significant. The court stated that representations (l) 
and (m) (R. 17) relating to the absence on the September 
30, 1954 financial statement of a liability for reserves and 
of a liability for unearned premiums was not believed by 
Knapp "since it appears probable that if plaintiff, Clyde J. 
Knapp, gave consideration to such items he would have 
assumed that there would be liabilities for outstanding poli-
cies and for unearned premiums". In other words, Knapp 
either knew these representations were false and did noth-
ing about it, or he could not reasonably rely on such state-
ments. Certainly, the absence of these items which are 
normally found on an insurance company's financial state-
ment should have made Knapp somewhat suspicious at the 
very outset of the negotiations. 
The trial court also found that the alleged misrepre-
sentation (h) that the company would pay a 10% dividend 
in the year 1954 was not relied on by Knapp as he ques-
tioned that fact (R. 19). According to Heaton, when 
Bullard made this statement "kind of a grin came upon 
his [Knapp's] face, he noticed it in particular because he 
couldn't take that * * *" (Tr. 191). Knapp testified 
he questioned Bullard about such a dividend "it didn't 
sound right for a new insurance company to start paying 
so soon * * *" (Tr. 96) But Knapp went no further 
with the matter, questioned no one about it and apparently 
made no objection to anyone when the company paid no 
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dividend, although certainly a dividend for 1954 would have 
been declared early in 1955. 
After the transaction was consummated and prior to 
the May stockholders' meeting, Knapp heard rumors that 
the president of the company, Bullard, was turning down 
business simply because he did not like the salesman who 
wrote the business (Tr. 129). Such a shocking accusation 
certainly suggested managerial incompetence if not wrong 
doing, and if true, must have had a serious effect on the 
financial condition of the company, but Knapp apparently 
ignored it-made no investigation at all. 
The evidence shows that the president of the company, 
Bullard, apparently anticipating a proxy fight at the May 
stockholders' meeting attempted to "wash out" Knapp's 
block of stock by offering to trade back the property Knapp 
had turned in for the stock he received (Tr. 691-692). 
Whether Knapp did agree to the trade or not, the very fact 
that the offer was made should have indicated to him that 
something was wrong, else Bullard would not have been 
so anxious to buy off Knapp's voting power. 
But assuming these facts separately or together did 
not give Knapp notice or establish a duty to inquire, cer-
tainly he received an eye-opener at the May stockholders' 
meeting. There Bullard stated that the Insurance Commis-
sioner "was giving trouble" about the Heaton and Knapp 
real estate (Tr. 131). Knapp grudgingly admitted (Tr. 
134) that "there was some mention" of the Insurance Com-
missioner's Notice of Intention to Revoke the Company's 
license in 30 days (Exhibit P-53). In fact, Bullard was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
sharply questioned about such notice and about the subse-
quent order (Exhibit P-54) giving the Company only five 
days to surrender its books or suffer receivership (Tr. 
698-699, 730-732) and was, in effect, called a liar for not 
admitting the issuance of the second order (Tr. 699). Ac-
cusations were made that the company was broke (Tr. 
731) and Bullard admitted that if new money was not put 
into the company, liquidation would be necessary and "we 
would lose everything" (Tr. 737). Reese Anderson stated 
that unless the company was refinanced, it would be taken 
over by the Insurance Commission, operated for the benefit 
of the policyholders and the stockholders would get nothing 
(Tr. 826). 
The letter from the Insurance Commissioner to Mr. 
Lowe (Exhibit P-52) was read (Tr. 824, 695-696). There 
was a discussion of the Commissioner's objections to the 
Knapp and Heaton properties (Tr. 696, 134). Bullard said 
that the company had been impaired (Tr. 730), but that 
steps were being taken to correct the situation. When 
Bullard was questioned further as to what impaired meant, 
Vernal Bergeson, a stockholder in attendance at the meet-
ing said it meant the company was broke and "Mr. Bullard 
has thrown our money away" (Tr. 731). That there was 
merit in this statement was shown by the financial state-
ment (Exhibit D-68) distributed to the stockholders at the 
meeting (Tr. 696, 824). The financial statement was dis-
cussed ( Tr. 824) . 
If anything could shock Knapp out of his lethargy, the 
financial statement should have done it. It showed, among 
other things, a bank overdraft of in excess of $1,000 and 
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cash on hand of only $270.69. Amounts due from agents 
had increased to $43,000-nearly double the amount shown 
on the September 30th statement. (The comparison is im-
portant because it is the financial data shown on the SeP-
tember 30, 1954 statement (Exhibit P-4) which Knapp 
claims he relied on in making the trade of his property for 
the stock.) Liabilities of about $18,000 were shown, plus 
an additional amount of $4,500 shown in the footnote to the 
balance sheet. Quite a contrast from the $3,400 liabilities 
on September 30th. 
Knapp did not recall such a statement at the meeting 
though he admitted it might have been distributed (Tr. 
136-137). He did recall receiving Exhibit P-69. There it 
was plainly stated that on March 31, 1955, the company 
had a bank overdraft of nearly $3,000. Cash had decreased 
from $10,000 at the end of 1953 to $1,600 at the end of 1954 
and was only slightly more than $900 as of March 31, 1955. 
Although liabilities had decreased slightly from December 
31, 1954, as of March 31, 1955, the liabilities were about 8 
times larger than the liabilities shown on the September 
30, 1954, statement. Of the $23,000 in bonds shown on the 
September 30th statement, only $11,900 was left on March 
31, 1955. 
Despite all this, Knapp was unconcerned about what 
went on at the meeting (Tr. 136). He was willing to rely 
on Mr. Bullard to correct the situation (Tr. 135) even 
though he agreed to run as a director on Mr. Lowe's slate 
-the purpose of which was to unseat Bullard. He wanted 
to be a director to protect his investment and "so I could 
get in anrl perhaps correct affairs" (Tr. 135-136). He felt 
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that the only corrective measures necessary were to change 
the nature of the real estate acquired from himself and 
Heaton-real estate which he knew made up a major part 
of the assets of the company. But he did nothing to de-
termine whether the corrective measures were taken. Al-
though he had run as a director so he could participate in 
these corrective measures, when a dispute arose as to the 
computation of the vote·, he sat back and. decided the only 
thing to do was to forget being elected a director (Tr. 147). 
He did not inquire of the Insurance Department of the 
status of the orders referred to at the meeting and whether 
the company had corrected the matter. The extent of his 
diligence was to ask Mr. Bullard at a casual meeting, "How 
are things coming?", to which Bullard answered, "Fine" 
(Tr. 149). 
May passed and Knapp did nothing. June passed and 
Knapp did nothing. July passed and Knapp did nothing. 
Then in August, 1955, Heaton called Knapp and asked him 
if he wanted to trade back his stock for the property (Tr. 
157-160). Knapp claims that he felt the corrective measures 
referred to in the stockholders' meeting had been made by 
August (Tr. 157). But was he concerned that no such mea-
sures had been taken by August when the Company still 
had the real estate and wanted to get rid of it to Knapp? 
Apparently not. His reaction was to stand pat for "when 
you make an investment you don't want to take it back, 
you want to make some money" (Tr. middle page 158). 
By his own inaction after notice, Knapp waived his 
right to rescind. He had notice prior to the stockholders' 
meeting but when rumors of mismanagement were circu-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
lated he was apparently unconcerned. When no dividend 
was paid as represented Knapp did nothing. He had notice 
of the most startling kind, for such an "innocent" as he, 
from the statements made at the stockholders' meeting and 
from the financial statements distributed there. He had 
notice when the company offered to trade back, a trade 
back made necessary in order to remove the inadmissible 
real estate from the company's books and thus satisfy the 
Insurance Commissioner. Knapp knew of the Commission-
er's demand at the time of the stockholders' meeting. In 
fact, according to Knapp this conversion of assets was the 
only thing he recalled "of any importance that was to be 
done" (Tr. 134-135). That this had not been done more 
than three months after the meeting where the need for 
immediate correction was first stated, should have excited 
some suspicion in a man with his business background. 
Contrast these facts with what Knapp claims (Tr. 
43) first excited his suspicion-the letter from Reese An-
derson (Exhibit P-11) dated August 30, 1955. The letter 
merely referred to the necessity for a reorganization and 
urged prompt action by the stockholders to effectuate it. 
Reorganization of a sort involving investment by a group 
of doctors had been discussed at the stockholders' meeting 
in May (Tr. 131, 132) and it was stated that the Insurance 
Commissioner would take over the company unless it was 
recapitalized (Tr. 826). The letter was rather mild in tone, 
merely requesting a prompt decision on signing the voting 
trust agreement. It speaks of continuing the company in 
business by a recapitalization in contrast to the discussion 
at the stockholders' meeting three months earlier of the 
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Insurance Commissioner's order threatening to terminate 
the company's right to do any business. If the letter made 
him suspicious of fraud committed in December, why then 
did he ignore the Commissioner's orders or the financial 
statements discussed at the May meeting? We respectfully 
contend that Knapp failed to exercise the diligence required 
of him and is thus precluded from rescinding at this time. 
As Justice Elias Hansen stated in his concurring opinion to 
Skola v. Merrill, supra: 
"He should not be permitted to hold the stock 
to see if it would turn out to be a profitable invest-
ment despite the claimed fraud, and then when it 
did not prove profitable recover back all that he 
paid. It may be that plaintiff has an action at law 
for fraud, but upon this record he is not entitled to 
rescission (64 P. 2d at 192) ". 
(b) Plaintiffs' action should be barred by laches. 
In addition to Knapp's lack of diligence! which we feel 
is an element of plaintiffs' cause of action, we believe the 
facts also support the affirmative defense of laches. 
Upon notice from the Insurance Commissioner that the 
Knapp property was an inadmissible asset, it became nec-
essary for the company to convert it into admissible form. 
In August defendant approached plaintiff in an attempt 
to arrange a trade back of the property. When Knapp 
turned the deal down "to wait and see what happens", the 
company was forced to sell the property to Heaton. Upon 
the sale it became impossible to place the parties in status 
quo. Had Knapp acted diligently it would now be possible 
to return the property to him. 
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In Raht v. Sevier Mining & Milling Company, 18 Utah 
290, 54 Pac. 889, plaintiffs sued to recover certain mining 
stock which had been sold under an invalid assessment. The 
Utah court in declaring the claim barred by laches stated: 
"A party claiming an interest should be held 
to prompt action and decide whether he will share 
the risks or stand clear from them." 
See also Skola v. Merrill, supra; Sanders v. McGill, 9 Cal. 
2d 145, 70 P. 2d 159; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. 
s. 587. 
The necessity of refinancing the company was dis-
cussed as early as the May stockholders' meeting and be-
ginning in August and continuing through September and 
October the company took steps to reorganize. By Septem-
ber 13th (Exhibit P-12) it became apparent that there 
would be a devaluation of the stock in order to establish an 
equitable division between the new and old stockholders. 
It was only after the reorganization plan was nearly com-
pleted that Knapp gave notice of his intention to rescind. 
By that time it was too late for the new stockholders to 
back out as their investment of $200,000 had already been 
placed in escrow (see Exhibit P-14). 
Thus, due to Knapp's delay, the defendant has been 
prejudiced in these two respects and Knapp's claim should 
be barred by laches. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
MONEY JUDGMENT AWARDED PLAINTIFFS 
IN THIS ACTION. 
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Plaintiffs' complaint is for rescission and prays for 
reconveyance of the real and personal property and con-
tracts therefor, or in case defendant is unable to so recon-
vey, for the value of such property. They further allege 
that the "agreed and reasonable value" of such property 
was the sum of $34,383.03. It was conceded that the altern-
ative prayer applied for both the real estate and the per-
sonal property are out of defendant's hands and defendant 
cannot be required to do that which it has no power to do. 
We contend it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove, 
as a prerequisite to any money judgment, that the prop-
erty was worth what they allege it to be. The purpose of 
an action in rescission is to restore the status quo. Assum-
ing the other prerequisites to the action have been met, 
including diligence of the plaintiff, the ordinary result is 
to restore the property in kind. If plaintiff had paid cash, 
then the court restores that amount of cash, plus interest. 
If an exchange of property is involved, the court orders a 
reconveyance. But where the property cannot be recon-
veyed, the court must award its equivalent in cash and 
since the purpose of the action is to restore the status quo, 
this equivalent must be the value of the property at the 
time of the transaction. Otherwise, there is no assurance 
that the true status quo is restored without penalty to the 
defendant or unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs. 
This was clearly recognized in the case of Marks v. 
Howkins, 55 Cal. App. 664, 203 Pac. 1035. In that case the 
plaintiffs traded their home plus some cash for a farm. 
Because the farm was not as represented, they asked and 
received rescission. The court awarded judgment requir-
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ing reconveyance by both parties, but if defendant failed to 
reconvey within 60 days, plaintiffs were given a money 
judgment which the findings recited represented the cash 
value of the house traded by plaintiffs. On appeal, com-
plaint was made of the alternative judgment. The court 
held the judgment was proper so that the parties could be 
returned to status quo. Noting that the property might 
depreciate or have been transferred to innocent third par-
ties (there was no evidence that either of these things had 
happened) the court stated: 
"Certainly, in either of the suppositions cases, 
the plaintiffs would be entitled to be paid, in lieu 
of the deli very to them of the possession of the 
property, the value thereof at the time of the con-
summation of the agreement of exchange." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In Blahnik v. Small Farms Improvement Co., 181 Cal. 
379, 184 Pac. 661, plaintiff purchased real estate for $3,750. 
Defendant acknowledged receipt of $2,300 which it was 
shown was paid not in cash but by the transfer of other real 
estate. On rescission, the property traded not being avail-
able for reconveyance, judgment was awarded for $2,300 
notwithstanding evidence of value which at most would 
have fixed the actual value at only $2,000. In reversing this 
judgment, the court stated: 
"The [trial] court, apparently, proceeded upon 
the theory that the plaintiffs were entitled to treat 
the amount for which said property was taken in 
exchange as a payment in money upon the price of 
the property sold to the plaintiffs by defendant and 
to recover said amount upon a rescission. In this 
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the court erred. If the defendant had retained the 
title to the property, the most that the plaintiffs 
could have demanded upon the rescission would have 
been a reconveyance thereof to them. The defen-
dant having parted with the title thereto, and being 
unable to restore the plaintiffs to the position in 
which they were at the time the contract was made, 
the rule in equity is that they must compensate the 
plaintiffs for the loss thereby sustained. This would 
not be the price at which the property had been 
accepted upon the contract of sale, but would be its 
value at that time and it was therefore necessary 
for the court to determine such value. * * * 
The plaintiffs were not entitled to more than the 
actual value of the property at the time of the ex-
change. The judgment giving them the full amount 
at which it was taken in the contract is erroneous 
to the extent of the difference between the actual 
value and the price so fixed in the exchange. For 
this reason a reversal is necessary. The complaint 
did not raise this question, but it was put in issue 
by the allegations of the answer. There should have 
been a finding of the actual value of the property 
at that time and the judgment should have covered 
that amount only." 
Lasher v. Faw, 209 Cal. 726, 289 Pac. 821, directly 
supports our position. There property was deeded defen-
dant under an agreement of plaintiff to pay $2,500 or con-
vey the property. He chose the latter alternative. There-
after, the defendant sold the property for $2,000. The 
court granted rescission and because reconveyance was im-
possible, gave plaintiff judgment not for $2,000 or the 
$2,500 value stated in the contract but for $4,000, the rea-
sonable market value of the property. 
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In Swan v. Talbot, 152 Cal. 142, 94 Pac. 238, 17 L. R. 
A., N. S. 1066, plaintiff, through defendant's fraud, con-
veyed property worth $21,900 in exchange for $200 cash 
and satisfaction of a $10,600 indebtedness. Because rescis-
sion could not be granted in kind, the property having been 
conveyed to a third person, judgment was granted and 
affirmed on appeal for the difference between the value 
of the property conveyed and the amount of the indebted-
ness. 
In Merigold v. Gagnon, 131 Cal. App. 213, 20 P. 2d 986, 
plaintiffs sought to rescind a land transaction wherein 
plaintiffs agreed to purchase land from defendants. In 
payment plaintiffs transferred land which the contract 
recited was worth $3,735, paid cash of $50 and agreed to 
make additional monthly payments of $50. The trial court 
denied rescission and on appeal plaintiffs contended a find-
ing they had paid only $50 was unsupported by the evidence 
as land worth $3,735 had also been "paid". The appellate 
court held the finding was proper, that the $3,735 repre-
sented the land and on rescission plaintiffs could only 
recover the value of the land at the time of the transaction. 
There being no evidence of value offered "the finding of 
the trial court was actually demanded by the state of the 
evidence". Note that the statement in the contract that the 
land was worth $3,735 did not fix the value of the land on 
rescission and was not considered by the court even to be 
evidence of value. 
Plaintiffs have completely failed to prove the value of 
the property they transferred. They took the position 
t!u·oughout the trial that the amount stated in the exchange 
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agreement (Ex. P-9) was binding upon the parties to the 
exchange agreement and no proof could be introduced of 
the actual value of the property at the time of the exchange. 
We offered proof as to the fair market value of the traded 
property (Tr. 795-809, Ex. 71; Tr. 88-91, Exs. D-18 and 
D-19), but plaintiffs insisted that the "agreed value" stated 
in the exchange agreement controlled and no evidence to 
the contrary could be introduced. Plaintiffs did not assert 
that the price stated in the exchange agreement was evi-
dence of the fair market value but in effect stated that the 
fair market value was unimportant because the price had 
been agreed upon in the written contract between the par-
ties. The trial court accepted this view and gave judgment 
accordingly. 
The result is that plaintiffs have recovered a money 
judgment for what we believe to be in excess of the fair 
market value of the traded property. The status quo has 
not been restored. Plaintiffs have been enriched to the ex-
tent of the difference between the value of the property 
they traded and the fair market value at the time of the 
trade and defendant has been penalized accordingly. To 
avoid this unjust result the judgment must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. WALDO, JR., 
of Ray, Rawlins, Jones 
& Henderson, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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